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Controversies Surrounding the 
Hopelessly III Patient 
Ned H. Cas$em, S.J. , M.D. 
Dr. Cassem, who acted as Guest 
Editor for this issue of the Lin-
acre Quarterly, is Associate Pro-
fessor of Psychiatry , Harvard 
Medical School , and is a member 
of the psychiatry staff at M assa-
chusetts General Hospital . He is 
also Faculty Consultant, Center 
for Law and Health Sciences. 
Boston University and Director of 
Residency Training (Psychiatry) 
at Massachusetts General. 
I n this article, Dr. Cassem ex-
amines the controversies which 
have arisen in dealing with a 
"terminal" or " hopelessly ill" pa-
tient. Dr. Cassem is a frequent 
contributor to medical journals , 
including Critical Care Medicine 
and the New England Journal of 
Medicine. 
When does our medical treat-
ment of dying patients become 
unjustified abuse? During the last 
70 hours of his life in Siskiyou 
General Hospital, California, Emil 
A. Liloiva accumulated a medical 
bill in excess of $10,000. His treat-
ment included two unsuccessful 
cardiac operations. After his 
death, the County Administrator 
rejected the hospital'3 claim for 
the portion of the patient's bill 
related to those final three days. I 
This is perhaps the first of several 
lawsuits against hospitals arguing 
that certain treatment of irrever-
sibly ill patients was unjustified. 
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Elliot Slater2 pointed out that the 
two goals of medicine - the re-
lief of suffering and the preserva-
tion of health - can become, for 
the dying patient, mutually con-
tradictory. The proportion of ir-
reversibly ill persons in whom this 
dilemma may exist is suggested 
by data from England indicating 
that not less than 68 % of the 
deaths in that country occurred 
after a long illness , predominantly 
stroke and cancer. '\ Not less than 
half of those individuals were over 
75 years of age . 
Reflecting the recent surge of 
national protest against hospitals 
and physicians for unnecessarily 
prolonging life in this category of 
patient, Abelson I wrote, "Death 
of a loved one was bad enough 
when it was in the hands of God; 
now it is often a much more dis-
tressing experience." When using 
heroic measures to treat terminal-
ly ill patients, physicians are in-
creasingly accused of inhumanity, 
experimentation, cruelty, and/ or 
biological idolatry. U.S. News and 
World R eport (May 22, 1972), 
Time (July 16, 1973), Atlantic 
(February 1974) , New York 
Times Magazine (June 23,1974), 
and many other popular articles, 
along with Patrick Henry and 
euthanasia societies from coast to 
coast, proclaim that "death with 
dignity" is often preferable to life 
without it. Celebrities have en-
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dowed this movement for "death 
with dignity" with credibility and 
considerable imp e t us . Medical 
Nobel laureate Sir Macfarlane 
Burnet, for e x amp Ie , stated: 
"Death in the old should be ac-
cepted as something always in-
evitable and sometimes positively 
desirable. Doctors should not 
compel old people to die more 
than once." To emphasize his en-
dorsement he carried a card with 
the message: "I request that, in 
view of my age (73), any pro-
longed unconsciousness, whether 
due to accident, heart attack or 
strokes, should be allowed to take 
its course without benefit of an 
intensive-care or resuscitation 
ward." 
Indeed some blame t he ad-
vancement of modern technologi-
cal devices for treatment now 
available in hospitals for creating 
an "ethical crisis." On Saturday 
evening, January 5, 1974, ABC 
television network further pub-
licized the dilemma of persons 
with terminal illness by showing 
"ABC News Close-up: The Right 
To Die." This program highlight-
ed that some persons have felt it 
so necessary to protect themselves 
from excessive treatment when 
they are hopelessly ill that they 
are signing living wills. Since 
1969 the Euthanasia Education 
Council has distributed more than 
a quarter million of these docu-
ments. Legislation to make them 
legally binding has been intro-
duced in Delaware, Oregon, Mon-
tana, Mas sac h use t t s , Idaho, 
Illinois, West Virginia, and Flori-
da. Currently the U.S. House of 
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Representatives is considering bill 
HR 2655, which would establish a 
Commission on Medical Tech-
nology and Dignity of Dying. 
In response to similar pressures 
the New York Academy of Medi-
cine on December 20, 1972, issued 
an official statement, "Measures 
Employed to Prolong Life in Ter-
minal Illness." '; The statement 
pointed out that traditional reli-
gious ethics have always recog-
nized there is no obligation on the 
part of a physician to use heroic 
measures to prolong life in hope-
lessly ill patients, and that there 
is no prohibition against the use 
of narcotics to ease pain even 
though such medication may 
shorten life. The statement urged 
that consideration be given to the 
following: 
1. Mere preservation of life 
must not be the sole objec-
tive of treatment. 
2. The physician should dis-
cuss the situation with the 
patient or family and should 
encourage both the patient 
and the family to express 
their feelings and wishes. 
3. The opinions and recom-
mendation of the family 
physician should be ob-
tained even if he is not a 
physician of record in the 
particular case. 
4. The views of religious ad-
visers may be helpful. 
To conclude: When, in the 
opinion of the attending physi-
cian, measures to prolong life 
which have no realistic hope of 
effecting significant improve-
ment will cause further pain 
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and suffering to the patient and 
the family, we support con-
servative, passive medical care 
in place of heroic measures in 
the management of a patient 
afflicted with a terminal ill-
ness. ·; 
Catholic Moral Tradition 
"Euthanasia" is such an in-
flammatory word that its use 
occasionally makes rational dis-
cussion impossible. However, most 
of the proponents of "death with 
dignity" favor negative (or pas-
sive) euthanasia - allowing a 
person to die naturally from an 
already fatal illness. As early as 
1957, Pope Pius XII stated that 
there was no moral obligation to 
use extraordinary means to pro-
long life in hopelessly ill patients, 
and added that agents such as 
narcotic analgesics could be ad-
ministered to relieve suffering, 
even though their use might 
shorten the life of the patient." 
Traditional moral and medical 
teaching has almost universally 
regarded positive (or active) eu-
thanasia - direct administration 
of a lethal agent, such as potas-
sium chloride - as unethical and 
forbidden. The distinction which 
differentiates potassium chloride 
from morphine given to relieve 
pain includes both the intention 
of the physician (to relieve pain 
rather than to kill) and the ef-
fects of the drug. Potassium 
chloride, when administered in 
lethal dose, has no beneficial ef-
fects. Williams, in a survey of 
physicians six years ago, found 
that 89% stated they were in fa-
vor of negative euthanasia and 
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80% admitted to having prac-
ticed it. Only 15% favored posi-
tive euthanasia/ Few physicians 
regard the mere existence of 
elaborate technological devices as 
a moral mandate for their use on 
all mortally ill patients. 
In fact, St. Christopher's Hos-
pice in London has gained inter-
national fame for offering a facili-
ty in which terminal patients can 
die comfortably without, in some 
cases, so much as an intravenous 
line if the latter is not warranted.~ 
Why then does the public behave 
as though the opportunity to die 
comfortably will be denied them 
by physicians and hospitals? 
Fears of Terminal Abuse and 
Loss of Dignity 
Medical science has in no way 
slowed its technological advance. 
Bypass grafts, intraaortic balloon 
pumps, membrane oxygenators, 
advances in transplantation and 
other forms of surgery, new drugs 
against microbial and malignant 
invaders, plus increasingly sensi-
tive monitoring devices for all 
who survive the heroic treatments 
- all now offer chances of sur-
vival that approach the miracu-
lous. Persons who would have 
surely died - and before might 
never have been treated - are 
now given whatever chance they 
have in the operating room or 
ICU. The condition is worse to 
start with and failure is common. 
Because the new technologies are 
commonly painful and usually 
awkward, families of the dead 
often que s t ion in retrospect 
whether the last ditch effort was 
worth it. Were the final heroics 
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only a humiliation inflicted on an 
individual whose demise was in-
evitable anyway? Couldn't he 
have died more comfortably, even 
with dignity, without them? The 
calculus is therefore simple: per-
sons in increasingly desperate 
straits are being given better 
chances of survival, and the crowd 
who linger with this hope at the 
brink of death has swollen. It is 
a time of tremendous stress both 
for the sick and those who take 
care of them. Frustrations become 
accusations : doctors preserve life 
merely for its own sake, experi-
ment for their gains, or commit 
murders of convenience; good 
money is being squandered on 
hopeless cases; healthy younger 
persons are excluded from ICU 
beds occupied by the unsalvage-
able; society's resources are being 
wasted , etc. But society continues 
to demand care and the chance to 
live, forgetting that indignity may 
well be an inevitable part of the 
gamble. More persons are taking 
the gamble, and, like soldiers, in-
creasing numbers survive the con-
flict but have lost the war. They 
and their families ask , "Death is 
bad enough, why make it worse?" 
What is "Death"? 
Most persons have no desire to 
have their body's life maintained 
long after i rr eve r sib I e brain 
damage has occurred. Of course, 
if a person could be proved dead, 
then most would agree artificial 
support of organs is not justified. 
With increasing de man d for 
transplant patient donors , pres-
sure to define when a person is 
dead became intense. Because the 
92 
ethical code requires that the do-
nor be dead before organs are to 
be removed before transplanta-
tion , a major contribution came 
with the Harvard criteria of brain 
death: absence of receptivity or 
responsivity, no s pontaneous 
movements or breathing, no re-
flexes , and an isoelectric EEG, all 
repeated at two intervals 24 hours 
apart." (This definition of death 
is not recognized by civil law in 
any state except Kansas, lo Mary-
land, and in a special way Con-
necticut I I). Despite criticism of 
including EEG data among the 
criteria ,12.14 the essence of the 
concept remains intact leaving the 
conscientious physician with a 
set of criteria for judging clinical 
death. But a paradox remains. 
In Palm Springs General Hos-
pital, Hialeah, Florida, Mrs . Car-
men Martinez, 72, suffering from 
longstanding hemolytic anemia, 
asked her physician, Dr. Rolando 
Lopez, to spare her a splenectomy 
and all further cutdowns. When 
Dr. Lopez sought a court decision 
about granting her wish, Judge 
David Popper of Miami ruled that 
she had a right to refuse the treat-
ment.'i Skillman If, argues that 
physicians are forced to make de-
cisions about continuing or stop-
ping heroic measures long before 
brain death occurs. Like Mrs. 
Martinez, increasing numbers re-
quest not to be kept alive until 
their brains are dead. 
Why the Opposition to 
"Death With Dignity"? 
Despite widespread general op-
position to prolongation of life at 
any cost in an illness already ir-
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reversible, the "death with dig-
nity" movement, as well as Living 
Wills, have met considerable re-
sistance. Several important fac-
tors appear to be involved. 
1. The Moral Domino Theory. 
Increasing attention has been 
given of late to the "slippery 
slopes" of science. 1 i According to 
this position, the power to decide 
for death over life will corrupt its 
possessors, lead to direct (active 
or "mercy") killing of patients, 
and progress to genocide or other 
forms of mass extermination. The 
first fear received some support 
of the level of ethical theory for 
while most moral philosophers 
and theologians like Ramseyl S 
and McCormick l') sharply distin-
guish the positive (active) from 
negative (passive) euthanasia, 
Joseph Fletcher21l• 2 1 regards the 
two as identical. Most recently 
Rachels22 argues the distinction 
has no moral importance in that 
active euthanasia is more humane 
in many cases than passive eu-
thanasia. Charles Curran!'! also 
regards the two as identical, but 
only after the dying process 
(which he does not define) has 
begun. Therefore, it might seem 
that we would he empowering 
some persons to do away with 
others (see point 4 below). Fur-
thermore, those 0 p p 0 sed to 
"opening the door" to legalization 
of living wills or passive eutha-
nasia perhaps fear that it will 
open a slippery slope destined to 
end in practices little different 
from those of Nazi Germany -
a consummation devoutly to be 
shunned.24 
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2. Difficulty Defining Irreversi-
bility. When is an illness ir-
reversible? Even if we knew the 
probabilities of survival which are 
appropriate - 5%? 1 %? - a dif-
ferent set of criteria would have 
to be developed for every illness 
or at least for each type of organ 
failure (e.g., heart, liver, kid-
neys). Imperfect knowledge in 
these areas causes many physi-
cians to hesitate beforediscon-
tinuing treatment efforts. 
3. Accomplice To Suicide. Some 
have feared that legalization of 
living wills may leave those who 
comply with their requests open 
to the charge of their being ac-
complices to a suicide. 
4. Limitation of Care. DycF i 
has argued that the vagueness of 
the label "hopeless" tends to jus-
tify the limitation of care because 
hopeless connotes meaningless. 
Because the lives of irreversibly 
ill persons might be construed as 
meaningless, the care given them 
would be limited. For example, 
the old could be morally coerced 
to forego heroic surgery. 
5. Distrust of Human Nature. 
Successful execution of living 
wills presupposes that those re-
sponsible for the life of the signer 
act in his best interest. That is, 
the signer would not be allowed to 
die just because he was cantank-
erous, because he arrived in the 
emergency ward at 2 a.m., be-
cause the hospital census was too 
full, etc. There are those who be-
lieve that this is too much to ask 
of human nature, for the same 
reason that it is too much to ex-
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pect that every nursing home re-
semble St. Christopher's Hospice. 
Reaction of the 
American Medical Association 
Perhaps the above and other 
reasons prompted the cautious re-
sponse of medical societies in gen-
eral and the AMA in particular 
to the question of "death with 
dignity." The interest of the 
AMA became clear when its Ju-
dicial Council s p 0 n s 0 red the 
Fourth Nat ion a I Congress on 
Medical Ethics, April 26-28, 1973, 
although its scope was consider-
ably broader than the "right to 
die." Specific treatment of the 
questions of active and passive 
euthanasia came when, at its De-
cember 1973 convention in Ana-
heim, California, the AMA con-
de m ned "mercy killing." Al-
though opposing efforts to obtain 
a legal definition of the moment 
of death, they adopted the follow-
ing resolution on "death with 
dignity": 
The cessation of the employment of 
extraordinary means of prolonging 
the life of the body when there is 
irrefutable evidence that biological 
death is imminent is the decision of 
the patient and /or his immediate 
family. 
Furthermore, although there 
has been great reluctance, for 
medico-legal reasons, to record 
orders like "DNR" (do not re-
suscitate) or "CMO" (comfort 
measures only) in the chart or 
order book, the American Medical 
Association has very recently 
recommended such a practice. In 
a recent supplement to their 
J oumal entitled "Standards for 
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation 
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(CPR) and Emergency Cardiac 
Care (ECC) ," the following state-
ment was made: 
The purpose of cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation is the prevention of 
sudden, unexpected death. Cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation is not in-
dicated in certain situations, such 
as ' in cases of terminal irreversible 
illness where death is not unex-
pected or where prolonged cardiac 
arrest dictates the futility of re-
suscitation efforts. Resuscitation in 
these circumstances may represent 
a positive violation of an individ-
ual's right to di e with dignity. 
When CPR is considered to be con-
traindicated for hospital patients, it 
is appropriate to indicate this in the 
patient's progress notes. It also is 
appropriate to indicate this on the 
physician's order sheet for the bene-
fit of nurses and other personnel 
who may be called upon to initiate 
or participate in cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation.2 6 
How Does One Decide to 
Forego Heroic Measures? 
Even though there may be 
unanimous agreement that there's 
a time to stop trying to prolong 
life and evidence that 80% of 
physicians have at some time 
done SO, 26 there are no unanimous 
guidelines for discharging this 
awe s 0 m e responsibility. Two 
oversimplified and premature, if 
convenient, methods are the eco-
nomic solution and the effort to 
define quality of life by defining 
who qualifies for personhood. 
The economic solution is now 
employed in certain provinces of 
Canada, where each hospital is 
given a budget and told simply to 
decide how they wish the money 
to be spent. The utilization of 
facilities for the hopelessly ill 
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must then be weighted against 
their use for "more salvageable" 
persons. Of course the hope is 
that the hospital will then be 
forced to find the most responsi-
ble and humane solution to their 
life-and-death dilemmas. How-
ever, each decision to stop the 
fight against a lethal illness has 
moral, technological (or medical) , 
legal, and psychosocial consider-
ations as well as economic ones. 
To assert that the economic fac-
tors should be the sole or primary 
determinants of policy is surely a 
distortion of priorities as well as 
an oversimplification of a complex 
and grave issue. Furthermore, se-
lection of a sole economic cri-
terion by a wealthy nation like 
the United States which spends 
billions on methods of destroying 
health and lives, is open to serious 
question. 
The "quality of life" solution 
seeks to help by defining the 
marks of human personhood so 
that "mere biological life" need 
not be prolonged. Joseph Fletcher 
is probably the best known pro-
ponent of this effort and includes 
among defining marks of "hu-
manhood": minimal intelligence 
(LQ. greater than 40), ability to 
communicate with others, control 
of existence, self-awareness, self-
control, curiosity, a sense of past, 
present and future, creativity / 
changeability, distinctiveness, a 
balance of rationality and feeling, 
and neocortical functioning.27 In 
addition to the specters awaiting 
us at the foot of the "slippery 
slope" descending from this for-
mulation, it shares all the follies 
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of pure abstractions. Even though 
infants, our patients, our spouses, 
our colleagues or ourselves might 
not qualify as persons under these 
criteria, the decision to let an in-
dividual die is not necessarily 
clarified by their application. We 
would do well to heed Ingelfin-
ger's warning: " As there are few 
atheists in fox holes, there tend 
to be few absolutists at the bed-
side." 28 
Must we then say nothing ethi-
cally? McCormick29 reminds us 
that failure to seek guidelines for 
these decisions leaves only the 
alternatives either of dogmatism 
or of pure concret ism. There must 
be some line that can be drawn 
between vitalism (life at any 
cost) and pessimism (death when 
life becomes frustrating, burden-
some, useless). Both extremes are 
based on an idolatry of life. Mc-
Cormick used life as a relative 
good and the duty to preserve it 
a limited one. McCormick for-
mulates life as a value to be pre-
served only where it contains 
some essential for human rela-
tionships. When, because of the 
condition of the individual, this 
potential would be completely 
subordinated to the mere effort 
for survival, then the life can be 
said to have achieved its po-
tential. 
Are there any practical guide-
lines to help determine when the 
time has come to halt efforts to 
prolong life? Collins30 has em-
ployed a Dying Score derived 
from evaluation of five physiologi-
cal parameters (cerebral function , 
reflexes, respiration, circulation, 
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cardiac action) to study irreversi-
bility of illness in patients follow-
ing resuscitation. 
Two extremely important con-
tributions toward the further 
study and understanding of the 
components of life-and-death de-
cisions in critical care settings 
were recently presented in Criti-
cal Care Medicine. Cullen et a131 
presented a method for quantify-
ing the energy expenditure in car-
ing for ICU patients, both in 
terms of procedures performed 
and in number of personnel de-
voted to the effort. The Thera-
peutic Intervention Scoring Sys-
tem (TISS) provides a powerful 
tool for quantifying the intensity 
of effort invested in a critically 
ill person. The authors do not 
suggest even that it be used in 
deciding which patients should or 
should not be vigorously treated. 
What they provide is an invalu-
able measure for relating inter-
vention, cost, and use of personnel. 
to efforts at reversing specific po-
tentially lethal conditions. The 
TISS may help us answer the 
crucial question of what we can 
or cannot accomplish by medical 
technology in the effort to restore 
health. 
Tagge et a132 presented what 
appears to be the most promising 
method yet for deciding respon-
sibly when specific interventions 
are no longer reasonable. This 
Mount Sinai classification of pa-
tient care categories avoids en-
tirely the pit fall s of apriori 
criteria which must be met in or-
der for a decision to be made to 
decrease the intensity of care 
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given to a critically-ill person. Its 
genius lies in its establishment of 
a process, openly acknowledged 
and regularly exercised, by which 
the entire treatment (lCU) team 
is forced to confront the question 
of what is best for the whole per-
son in question. As such, the real 
question initially introduced -
is our intervention, in fact, abuse 
disguised as treatment-is forced 
from the shadows of taboo and 
secrecy and confronted in a way 
that guarantees (even forces) 
open, maximal communication. It 
seems clear from the experience 
at our own hospital that almost 
all the disputes over whether a 
terminally-ill patient should be 
treated more or less intensively 
have arisen because communica-
tion was faulty. One, of course, 
could argue that the team as a 
whole could be corrupted by pos-
session of such arbitrary power. 
However, when the family and 
the patient (whenever conscious) 
are partners to the decision, the 
threat of the "slippery slope" IS 
far less likely. 
The Hardest Work 
Talk of a degnified death may 
be, in fact, a form of self delusion. 
Suffering, p a i n f u 1 separation, 
grief and anguish are seldom en-
tirely absent from any death re-
gardless of our efforts to wish it 
away by slogans. 33,34 There may 
be an illusion in the minds of 
some that once the decision is 
made and no further heroics will 
be used, all difficulties are solved. 
That point is precisely where they 
are most likely to begin and where 
most care and attention need be 
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given to both patient and family. 
The responsibility for making de-
cisions to continue or omit ex-
treme measures is awesome 
enough. After they have been 
made, the delicate and sensitive 
issues of human suffering and loss 
demand even more compassion 
and courage to continue care un-
der those circumstances. Y oUhg 
physicians and nurses need more 
guidance in discharging these re-
sponsibilities. W hat our col-
leagues have confronted alone in 
past centuries we must now face 
together. 
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